It is often argued, not without basis, that Kosovo is the most advanced democracy in the Western Balkans, which is also confirmed by several important international indices such as the Democracy Report by the V-Dem Institute.
This achievement is not only a merit of our society, but is also related to the fact that our state-building is designed, supported and supervised by the most advanced Western democracies, on the premises of liberal democracy, a system of government based on the separation of powers, free elections, freedom of the media and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights, among others.
In this context, liberal democracy was not built naturally in Kosovo. It was the West that gave us the political, legal, and financial means to avoid sliding into a typical Balkan sultanate, or electoral autocracy.
By “Balkan sultanates” I mean autocratic governments or hybrid regimes, where political leaders are so dominant that they are almost equal to the state, and use all its resources without limit to stifle criticism and keep themselves in power. So, we are talking about regimes like the one in Turkey, Serbia or Albania, where there is political competition, but it is more formal, because the end is predetermined.
Kosovo managed to avoid this model thanks to considerable Western financial and technical support to build institutions according to democratic principles, as well as to strengthen the media and civil society, so that they can play the role of an accountability officer.
All of these instruments were and remain imperfect, but nevertheless in many key respects they worked and educated us. They brought about numerous rotations of power, considerable media freedom, and even the political victory of an anti-establishment party like the Vetëvendosje Movement. In this regard, Kosovo remains the only country in the region that has experienced several successive changes of power.
Kosovo is today classified as an electoral democracy, meaning that power is freely chosen, but oversight institutions are not yet strong enough to limit it. This is because we still have a weak democratic tradition and culture, which takes time to develop and improve.
These achievements of Kosovo in cooperation with the West are today in jeopardy.
The elections expected to be held on June 7 are a major test for the country. The outcome of these elections could determine whether Kosovo will continue its trajectory of consolidating democracy, or whether it will continue to slide towards autocracy or Balkan sultanate, at the mercy and dictate of one man.
Albin Kurti's relationship with liberal democracy is that of a chameleon that changes its stance depending on the interests of the moment. When he was in opposition as an anti-system player, Albin Kurti considered elected governments illegitimate and assessed the entire legal order in Kosovo as neo-colonial and imposed.
Kurti did not hesitate to use violence and means of sabotage against the democratic order, nor to use the free space created by liberal democracy to strengthen himself politically, such as the media and civil society.
However, upon coming to power, Kurti made a 180-degree turn, positioning himself as a fan and promoter of Kosovo's democratic successes, especially in the international arena, where, for the needs of securing support, he tried to build an image in contrast to Vučić and other regional leaders such as Edi Rama.
But, throughout the past mandate, Kurti showed all the first signs of authoritarianism and the desire to erode the mechanisms of control over his power. A characteristic feature of every authoritarian leader is the equalization of his interest with the interests of the state, as well as the imposition on society as a morally superior figure and in direct spiritual relationship with the "people".
In this way, the authoritarian leader legitimizes the attack on institutions as something that had to be done, perhaps in the name of sedition, the fight against corruption, or even the fight against external enemies like Serbia.
Like any other authoritarian and populist, Kurti has unhesitatingly and in a completely transparent manner misused state resources to strengthen his position and for electoral effects; he has inflated nationalism and the dangers from the external enemy (Serbia) to delegitimize domestic criticism (opposition, media, civil society), and to legitimize the appointment of political loyalists to all public institutions.
We saw in the first term what fate befell those appointed – such as those on the Independent Media Commission or the RTK Board – who refused to follow political orders but enforced the law. They ended up being targeted as criminals or traitors. Others who are appointed today know that they will not dare to repeat the “mistake”.
Kosovo continues to have democratic space – critical media, dominant opposition in local government, etc. – not because Kurti is tolerant of them, on the contrary, he does not yet have all the instruments at his disposal to subdue them.
But these authoritarian tendencies by Albin Kurti did not go unnoticed. For example, Kosovo, despite improvements in the last year, fell 43 places in the World Press Freedom Index between 2022 and 2024, reflecting not only a deteriorating environment for the media, but also a trend of weakening democracy.
Albin Kurti was willing to give up his four-year mandate in government because he is not interested in governing with accountability, but in installing complete control.
Kurti wants to control the government, the assembly, the independent institutions, the president, the media, the courts – this was seen even now by the speed with which this aborted mandate was used to put boards like the KMP and RTK under control. To achieve this goal, Kurti does not mind if the country goes to early elections three times.
It now remains in the hands of Kosovar voters to decide whether they will willingly support Kosovo's slide towards a Balkan sultanate like its neighboring countries. With Kurti so transparent in his intentions, voters cannot be said to have gone unwarned.
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