British history professor at Oxford University, Jamer Pettifer, says that the moment is approaching when many archives will be opened that will shed light on the wartime period in Kosovo.
He spoke on RTS, the Serbian public television, about the 1999 bombing and the US strategic plans, which had changed its stance on the KLA.
"We are approaching the thirty-year period when most governments, to a certain extent, open up official archives. So we now know a lot more," he said.
According to Pettifer, the bombing campaign over Serbia was "a rather confusing operation."
"The motivations were complicated: different parts of NATO wanted different results. And behind the scenes there was always the pressure to use the war in Kosovo to overthrow the Milosevic regime," he said.
The United States and the United Kingdom, behind the scenes, he said, “had regime change in mind – that the war in Kosovo could be used to destabilize the Milosevic regime.” And that, to a large extent, happened, he says.
"But it wasn't explicitly stated. And I think most European NATO member countries didn't see the situation that way."
"They simply wanted the war to end. Above all, countries like Italy and Greece, which are close to Serbia and Kosovo, did not want a major refugee problem affecting their countries. This was particularly pronounced in Italy, because they had already had a major problem with Albanian immigration a few years ago," he said.
At the time, Pettifer says, America projected most of its power from the sea. “The United States, as an international power, relies heavily on sea power. And that started long before the war in Kosovo.”
The US priority, he says, was “to try to establish strong influence, if not complete control, over the Adriatic coast – Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece – and to prevent the Russians from establishing any bases there. In Washington, for a certain period, they feared that the Russians might get a base in Montenegro. This was extremely important at that time.”
If Slobodan Milosevic had not led Serbia at that time, the Briton says he does not know what would have happened.
"At that time I thought there was a fairly coherent system that he was using in the old way, the way Tito used it. But that system collapsed under the pressure of events and I think Milosevic didn't understand that over time his position was weakening."
"We know that other actors, especially Seselj, were warning Milosevic about structural factors that were weakening Serbia's position, but he seemed not to pay much attention. Until the archives in Belgrade are opened, we probably won't know much more about this," he said.
Regarding the KLA, Pettifer was asked about the US's assessment of it, and the Serbian journalist mentioned that in Serbia this guerrilla army is considered a "terrorist organization."
"As we know, those who are terrorists for some, are freedom fighters for others. You can see this every day on television in the case of Palestine. No one in the world agrees on what exactly is a 'terrorist'. Political scientists write long books about this," he said.
After Richard Holbrooke's meeting with KLA representatives, Pettifer says that "there was definitely a major change in policy."
"Washington is a very complex place with many different organizations, with many people with different experiences and knowledge, and to a certain extent there is also rivalry between them. I'm sure it's like that in any large country."
"There were agencies in Washington that were very clearly committed to the overthrow of the Milosevic regime and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. There were others that leaned more toward stability and slower – evolutionary – change."
“The KLA was useful as a catalyst against the government and they were willing, maybe not to help it that much, but – to tolerate it,” he says.
The Briton says that Albanians “turned to military options rather than political ones” after 1995-1996 and “the KLA began to grow into a much larger organization.”
Milosevic's misperception, according to him, enabled the KLA to strengthen itself in places like Decani and Peja.
Transporting weapons and ammunition for the KLA, he says, was a big problem initially, but was later "solved" with the help of Albania, which was "in anarchy."
"In that anarchy it was possible to organize unhindered paramilitary training camps. So the year 1997 was very important, which I wrote about in my book 'The Albanian Issue'. Then it opened up as an important national issue for Albanians. And I think Milosevic understood this very slowly," he said.
Asked about the political careers of some of the KLA leaders and their detention before a trial at the Special Court in The Hague, Pettifer says, among other things, that this "is a well-known process in resolving conflicts after uprisings and was also implemented in Kosovo."
“Different people had different experiences and different leaders of the Kosovo Albanians were in practice sponsored by different parts of NATO, by different NATO countries,” he said.
He thinks that this judgment will not affect the future of Balkan politics.
"I think not. Look at what happened with the Hague trials of people like Thaçi, Selimi and others. These trials dragged on for too long and, according to all independent assessments, the judicial standard in The Hague is very low and the court's conduct has been extremely bad."
"I think this is now being understood, especially in the US. This, in the eyes of the ordinary Kosovo Albanian, has discredited the entire international justice process. This means that the imprisonment of these people has not affected politics. We have seen this," he said.
"Thaci's party did very well in the last elections even without him. Because now he is seen as a martyr and a national hero - after spending so long in prison without a sentence," he added.
Pettifer says that meanwhile "Kurti's party is losing support, partly because he was very vague about the Hague trials."
"So not much has been achieved. Can I ask you – did the trial of Milosevic and Seselj change anything in Serbia? I think not much, right?"
The bombing, he says, was something Milosevic "didn't understand clearly enough."
"There's been incredible destruction in Gaza, incredible amounts of ammunition used, but Hamas is still there. And Hamas will be there whether the bombing continues or not, so bombing is not particularly effective. Unless you have very specific circumstances."
“And it can be said that, because of the weakening of the Milosevic system – I think Seselj was claiming this at the time – the bombing was very dangerous for Serbia. I think Milosevic did not understand this clearly, at least not clearly enough. And he continued to think the same way he did five or ten years ago. But now I am not sure.”
"The whole bombing is now perceived as history. Today we live in a different Serbia. And I think it's good that this is now considered history," he said.
edition
t7 live
