Written by: Ditmir Bushati
The shift of American military assets to the Middle East in recent weeks was a warning sign of what we are seeing these days. The United States and Israel are conducting one of the most complex military interventions in Iran, which, unlike other times, looks set to last longer. What is happening is not the beginning of a world war, nor an isolated episode in the many conflicts that have accompanied the Middle East. But the most culminating point, so far, in a long game that is reshaping the world order.
To explain Iran’s role, we need to understand its key position as a strategic node, not simply as a regional power with nuclear ambitions. Iran is part of the ‘energy geography’, as it has influence over the Strait of Hormuz. Control of Hormuz has an impact on the oil and energy supplies of industrial economies in Asia and Europe. Iran’s malign network spanning several Middle Eastern states, although weakened in recent years, works against the projection of American power. Both Russia and China have an interest in Iran’s survival, as a capitulated Iran rearranges geography in favor of the US, with an impact from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean.
CONTROLLED ECONOMIC CHAOS
The length of the war is indicative of its complexity. The initial toll is clear. Iran’s key political and military leadership has been killed, including the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was replaced by his son. Its air and naval defense capabilities and ballistic missile capabilities have been damaged. Although Iran is weak against the combined power of the US and Israel, it reacted immediately by striking mainly civilian facilities, oil and gas facilities, technological infrastructure and US diplomatic missions in neighboring countries, none of which are belligerents, with the aim of influencing the US to end the war.
Tehran has activated its most visible lever of power, controlled economic chaos. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on energy infrastructure across the region have already caused a major rift in the global oil market. The inability to export crude threatens to permanently damage wells. Restoring supply after these disruptions is a lengthy process, leaving the global economy in a state of uncertainty. The gas market is also in chaos, as Qatar’s refinery, which produces a fifth of the world’s supply, is out of service.
Iran is playing with the time factor, as it knows that long wars do not enjoy popular support in the US. Iran's goal is to withstand the shock waves by trying to survive and show resilience. And on the other hand, to damage as much as possible the critical infrastructure of neighboring countries related to technology, energy, tourism and finance. Meanwhile, the costs of the war are paid by the Iranian population, which is powerless in the face of attacks.
ON A FRONT WITH DIFFERENT GOALS
While survival remains a priority for the regime in Tehran, the US initially declared that it undertook this military intervention with the aim of regime change. President Trump called on Iranians to rise up against the mullahs. Apparently, the hopes were for a scenario similar to that of Venezuela, where the aim was to find a person or group from within the corridors of power who would cooperate with the US.
At the moment, this is difficult, since the regime in Tehran, unlike that in Caracas, is not a personal regime, but structured in several dimensions, including theocratic and repressive security apparatus. Iran's ethnic composition is complex. Moreover, for decades the regime has managed to survive sanctions imposed by the West.
It seems that President Trump chose to act now, not because Iran posed a direct threat to the United States, nor because of its nuclear capability, which he declared destroyed with the brief air campaign of June last year, but based on the assumption that years of economic mismanagement, sanctions, the bloody suppression of popular protests in January, and military degradation had left Iran weaker than ever. Although we are in the second week of the war, the regime in Iran is still standing, and has shown no signs of capitulating.
The Iranian regime was thought to be weak after two US strikes last year. But history shows that regime change is a more difficult process, requiring ground forces, democratic assistance for institution-building, and an organized opposition ready to seize power. The US has ruled out sending ground forces, while Iran lacks an organized opposition. The protesters who took to the streets in January, whom the regime massacred by the tens of thousands, are unarmed, unorganized. They face an internal security apparatus that remains repressive and untouched by war. In short, Iran’s capacity and willingness to suppress its own population far outweighs its ability to remain a regional power.
Although it is a joint US-Israeli military intervention, it must be said that their goals are not the same. For Israel, the goal is not the weakening of nuclear capabilities, stability, or democratic change, but the capitulation of Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made no secret of Israel's goal of the total annihilation of the pillars of the regime and the final "settlement" with Iran, as the culmination of a forty-year conflict.
ON A FRONT WITH DIFFERENT GOALS
While survival remains a priority for the regime in Tehran, the US initially declared that it undertook this military intervention with the aim of regime change. President Trump called on Iranians to rise up against the mullahs. Apparently, the hopes were for a scenario similar to that of Venezuela, where the aim was to find a person or group from within the corridors of power who would cooperate with the US.
At the moment, this is difficult, since the regime in Tehran, unlike that in Caracas, is not a personal regime, but structured in several dimensions, including theocratic and repressive security apparatus. Iran's ethnic composition is complex. Moreover, for decades the regime has managed to survive sanctions imposed by the West.
It seems that President Trump chose to act now, not because Iran posed a direct threat to the United States, nor because of its nuclear capability, which he declared destroyed with the brief air campaign of June last year, but based on the assumption that years of economic mismanagement, sanctions, the bloody suppression of popular protests in January, and military degradation had left Iran weaker than ever. Although we are in the second week of the war, the regime in Iran is still standing, and has shown no signs of capitulating.
The Iranian regime was thought to be weak after two US strikes last year. But history shows that regime change is a more difficult process, requiring ground forces, democratic assistance for institution-building, and an organized opposition ready to seize power. The US has ruled out sending ground forces, while Iran lacks an organized opposition. The protesters who took to the streets in January, whom the regime massacred by the tens of thousands, are unarmed, unorganized. They face an internal security apparatus that remains repressive and untouched by war. In short, Iran’s capacity and willingness to suppress its own population far outweighs its ability to remain a regional power.
Although it is a joint US-Israeli military intervention, it must be said that their goals are not the same. For Israel, the goal is not the weakening of nuclear capabilities, stability, or democratic change, but the capitulation of Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made no secret of Israel's goal of the total annihilation of the pillars of the regime and the final "settlement" with Iran, as the culmination of a forty-year conflict.
EXIT STRATEGY
Can this military intervention topple a despicable and threatening regime in the Middle East and replace it with something better? Is there an exit strategy from this war, as initial reactions to this intervention gave a wide range of reasons, from weakening nuclear capabilities, Iranian diplomatic intransigence and failure of negotiations, to the belief that Israeli attacks on Iran were imminent, to regime change?
Although the reasons for regime change are compelling, the precedents so far do not help achieve the desired result. Since the 1950s, the US has tried unsuccessfully, at great human and financial costs, to change the political landscape in the Middle East. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why in the National Security Strategy published in November of last year, the US presented a more pragmatic approach to regimes in the Middle East, respecting the history and tradition of their populations.
Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, as more recent examples, are often resurfaced in public debate, whenever it comes to regime change or the impact of foreign policy on domestic policy. Despite predictions of exporting democracy, stability and prosperity, the conflict in Iraq continued for almost a decade and resulted in the loss of thousands of lives on both sides.
In the case of Afghanistan, it lasted nearly two decades, with a high death toll, and ended bitterly with the Taliban returning to power. Even without ground forces, regime change operations carry costs and risks. In Libya, where the US and its Western allies relied on air power, it took months of bombing before Muammar Gaddafi was killed. After that, Libya descended into civil war and violence that spread, along with refugees and weapons, to neighboring Chad and Mali.
Meanwhile in Syria, efforts to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad without ground forces proved even more exhausting. Even arming opponents did not lead to his downfall, but to an escalation of the conflict, intervention by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, and a brutal civil war, humanitarian catastrophe and flows of refugees mainly to Europe. Assad was forced to leave more than a decade later.
The reasons why it is harder to build a state and install a better government than to destroy a state or remove a bad government are no mystery. The removal of a bloody regime creates a political and security vacuum that is difficult to fill. Seen in this context, the prospects for regime change leading to a democratic Iran are slim, but continuing military intervention and striking at the critical infrastructure that sustains the regime in Iran could bring about a less radical leadership in the future.
Time will tell how likely this is. We are at the most unpredictable moment in the Middle East since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. As Henry Kissinger rightly thought about the 'interconnectedness of conflicts', how this war ends will have an impact not only on the critical issues that ignited it, such as nuclear capability, ballistic missiles or the sanctions regime against Iran. This war marks the culmination of a long game that is reshaping the world order, which looks set to be based more on power than on rules.
The analysis is a publication of the foundation Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tirana
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