Written by: Ditmir Bushati
For decades, the Munich Security Conference has served as an annual meeting of the transatlantic alliance. A place where American and European leaders, diplomats, and geopolitics professionals come together to exchange views on international security. Its starting point, since 1963, was based on the fundamental assumption that the relationship between the United States and Europe is stable with a clear division of tasks, under the leadership of the United States as the guarantor of security.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Munich Security Conference also transformed itself as a place for dialogue between transatlantic policymakers and opinion leaders from other powers and continents. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2007 speech in Munich marked a turning point in Russia's policy and positioning in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall, from a partner to a challenger to the rules and values of the world order and the West.
Every time I have attended this conference, I have noticed that the main topics of discussion have been related to the relations between the West and Russia, China, the middle powers or the Global South. But this year the atmosphere has changed. In his speech, US Vice President JD Vance did not hesitate to identify European partners as the “main problem” of the West’s weakness. This year’s conference report, entitled “Under Destruction”, where the US is described as a destroyer of the world order built over generations, and with no clear idea of a replacement order, did not reflect a transatlantic partnership, but a growing distrust.
Due to the tense climate within the transatlantic alliance, this year’s focus was on relations within the West itself, eclipsing its relations with other powers. Compared to Vice President JD Vance’s speech last year, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech was warmer, aiming to reassure European allies. Although Rubio argued that the fate of the United States will always be intertwined with that of Europe, he made clear that cooperation would depend on tightening borders, fighting immigration, and increasing defense spending.
The speech was notable for its lack of mention of Russian aggression in Ukraine and its lack of references to the democratic values and shared belief in freedom that once motivated the NATO alliance. Instead, Rubio presented a vision based on “Western civilization” that would fight against the real enemies: migration, climate cult, and other forms of modern degeneration.
The gist of the secretary of state’s message was clear: the United States will continue its partnership with Europe, not necessarily based on shared values, but according to Washington’s interests. This is the vision in which the United States aims to replace the Cold War West, which has been described as the “free world,” with a cultural West rooted in Christianity.
Over the past two decades, the way the United States has defined its national interest in the context of the geopolitical order has gradually changed. President Trump is an accelerator of this process, but not the cause. And this process will continue even after he is no longer in the White House.
This includes a number of policy areas that have been central to the orientation of American foreign policy since the Cold War: a shift away from free trade towards industrial policy, subsidies and higher tariffs; a reduced commitment to collective security in the absence of significantly greater burden-sharing by European allies in NATO on defense costs; opposition to weak border security and immigration policies; and skepticism towards democracy promotion, foreign aid and the international architecture of multilateral organizations.
Each of these changes reflects early grievances on the part of American citizens across the political spectrum and has resulted in a gradual but now structural shift in US foreign policy on the global level.
If I were to compare the world order and the spirit that characterizes transatlantic relations to a computer, I would say that we are now in the phase of restarting it, but the programs with which we can work have not yet appeared on the screen. After the end of World War II, two main elements have guided international relations. One is the international system, or as it is otherwise known, the group of multilateral organizations centered around the UN. The other is the power of the United States. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world was bipolar. After that, the United States was the sole superpower in the world. Although the UN was still important, American power weighed just as heavily in world events.
The failure of the old order in many respects cannot be denied even by the most ardent supporters of the UN. Important issues such as war and climate change are stuck in discussions, resolutions and votes, never addressed. The lack of balanced representation of all continents and the veto enjoyed by five states in the UN Security Council make decisions impossible.
Seen in this context, the US is pushing a different idea, prioritizing a different order that emphasizes interstate alliances and states as the primary actors rather than multilateral organizations. According to this vision, effective cooperation is best pursued through coalitions of the willing, not through frameworks that distribute authority across multilateral organizations with different interests. Collective action works when participating states agree on the means and the ends.
On the other hand, Europeans are becoming aware of this new reality within the transatlantic alliance, where we have a shift from values to common interests. European unity despite the Trump administration's stance on Greenland, whether in terms of security or economic terms, announcing reciprocal tariffs with those announced by the Americans, is the clearest example of this awareness.
In these conditions, the question that naturally arises is whether the broken trust in the transatlantic relationship can be restored. This is still possible starting from a new starting point, which focuses mainly on the common interests of allies on both sides of the ocean. It is an undeniable fact that the US National Security Strategy published last November places the relationship with Europe as the third priority, after the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. A shift that began during the first administration of President Obama.
It is an undeniable fact that, due to persistent pressure from President Trump's administration, the Europeans are now contributing much more militarily within the alliance. And, moreover, they are bearing the brunt of the war in Ukraine.
Europe’s relevance in the world will depend on its willingness to live in this new transatlantic reality. While European resolve and joint action are likely to continue, much of the energy will be devoted to working within existing transatlantic frameworks, particularly NATO. The fact that the United Kingdom and Italy are taking over NATO commands from the United States signals an important step towards creating a European “pillar” within the alliance.
Perhaps at the end of this process, NATO will look different, including the force ratios and contributions between allies, where the role of the US will be irreplaceable, especially with regard to nuclear defense, intelligence services, and artificial intelligence.
A European pillar within NATO is the most effective path to a secure Europe, while the US is reducing its responsibility for the continent’s defense. This is certainly more achievable than turning the EU into a military alliance or even defending Europe through formalized coalitions of the willing and able.
But the longer-term perspective can only be one where European countries are destined to come closer in areas related to their geopolitical position, related to geographical security and their ability to have defense, security and stability. The road to get to this point will be bumpy. However, this new transatlantic reality could also serve as an impetus towards a new Europe.
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