The political situation in Kosovo, relations with Serbia and the role of international actors in the region remain among the most discussed topics in the Western Balkans. In an interview for Radio Kosova, analyst Florian Bieber offers a critical look at the institutional crisis in Kosovo, the deep political polarization and the challenges of inter-party cooperation.
It also analyzes the prospects for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, the impact of frequent elections on democratic stability, and the increasingly limited role of the European Union and the United States in the region's political processes.
Radio Kosovo: How would you assess the current political situation in Kosovo and what are the main factors driving institutional instability today?
Florian Bieber: I think it is difficult to describe what is happening other than as a mess. The fact that the whole system, in a way, is functioning in the absence of legitimate institutions — government, parliament and president — is of course very destructive for Kosovo. The fact that we have had this instability, which has actually worsened over the last year, is not encouraging at all. I do not believe that there is only one factor. There are many factors, and they include both the opposition and the government or the dominant coalition. Everyone has acted in the calculation that rigid political positions bring them benefits, and so far this has been in favor of Vetëvendosje. But at the same time, there is no clear way out of this situation. I think this is not a positive signal for the political process in Kosovo, because the polarization is so strong that over the last year we have repeatedly gone from one instability and political crisis to another.
Radio Kosovo: Do you see the current political tensions in Kosovo as a short-term crisis or as a structural problem of its democratic system?
Florian Bieber: To some extent, this is certainly a longer-term issue, in the sense that there is a huge gap between Vetëvendosje and all other political parties, dating back many years. This became very apparent when the first Vetëvendosje government fell, then we had the interim government and then the return of Vetëvendosje in 2020–2021. So, this situation has been going on for a long time. This polarization creates a reality where there is practically no capacity for political cooperation, or cooperation has become almost impossible. This becomes especially problematic when the system relies on a situation where a single party — in this case Vetëvendosje — achieves electoral success by winning enough votes, but at the same time does not have such dominance that it can impose, for example, even a presidential candidate on the entire political system. So, the inability to find cooperation, at least on some key issues, is essentially a structural problem in Kosovo, which is today manifesting itself through this institutional crisis.
Radio Kosovo: How likely is it that Kosovo will face another round of early or extraordinary elections in the near future?
Florian Bieber: Again, I am not the one to decide this, but given what we have seen, it seems quite possible. There seems to be a willingness to go towards that option. The question is: what would it take to stop this? Because I don’t think the citizens benefit — neither the government nor the political stability benefit. The citizens do not benefit either. You could say that Kosovo’s “fate” is that it is operating in a system where even the neighboring countries are not very stable politically, so in a way it seems like it can cope with this situation. But, of course, it is not good for any country to have multiple elections. We have seen this in Bulgaria, where it leads to long-term weakening of political parties and high levels of political abstention by citizens. Citizens get tired and disillusioned with elections and democratic processes, and that is not good for any country or political system. So it seems possible and conceivable that there would be new elections, but I think that would be very harmful for democracy in Kosovo.
Radio Kosovo: In fact, there is widespread talk in Kosovo that the outcome of the next elections will be roughly the same. Are we moving from one crisis to another? Are we becoming like Bulgaria, a state in the same unstable state, even though Bulgaria is a member of NATO and the EU?
Florian Bieber: Yes, I think the example of Bulgaria is not very encouraging, because even though it is a member of NATO and the EU — unlike Kosovo — it is also the poorest country in the EU and the political instability that we have seen there has produced very unpredictable politics. We have also seen the success of former President Radev, who has followed a more pro-Russian line. So we do not know what will happen to the political system there. The problem in Kosovo is that if you have elections too often, first the voter turnout usually drops, and then the trust in political parties also drops. This can open the way for new unexpected political actors. In many ways, since the rise of Vetëvendosje, politics in Kosovo has been relatively stable, but Vetëvendosje has dominated for the last six years or so. This could be repeated if there are new elections, but at some point citizens may become more inclined to experiment, due to frustration. And then, of course, this creates space for populists to gain. That's why I think it's not good for democracy — especially for a democracy that's still relatively young — to go through this cycle, because it discredits the electoral process and citizens start to think: why vote again, when the result seems the same, and only because political parties are unable to cooperate on basic issues.
Radio Kosovo: I would like to talk about these ongoing, I would say, almost endless relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The dialogue has started, but it is not going anywhere. We are currently in a status quo. So, how would you describe a realistic path towards normalization of relations between the two countries, perhaps in the near future? Are you optimistic about this report?
Florian Bieber: Yes, I think that at the moment there is no dialogue in the practical sense. There is a formal dialogue, but there is no real dialogue. And I believe that the EU uses this process mainly to ensure that there are no major crises — so as a crisis management mechanism, not as a mechanism leading to mutual recognition and normalization. It is clear that political instability in Kosovo does not help, but on the other hand we have a government in Serbia that is in a deep crisis of legitimacy and that has never been willing to make the compromises necessary for the normalization of relations with Kosovo. So as long as this government is in power in Serbia, there is no reason to expect any solution or improvement. I think some things need to change. There needs to be a change of government in Serbia. This could happen as soon as next year, and it is likely that Vučić will lose the elections and a political transformation will occur. But this process is very likely to be difficult and turbulent, not easy. And whoever comes after Vučić, Kosovo will not be his top priority. It will be a very complicated issue in Serbia. First there needs to be a change in public opinion and political discourse in Serbia, to accept that Vučić's policies have led Serbia to a dead end. This will take time. So I think any real progress in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia will take several years before a serious process can be started again.
Radio Kosovo: So, does this process still have credibility in resolving disputes between the two countries?
Florian Bieber: The current process lacks credibility, but at the same time there is a need for some kind of agreement between the two countries, especially for Kosovo, because it has become clear that other states will not recognize Kosovo without some kind of solution. This is the real problem. I mean, Kosovo theoretically can live without recognition from Serbia — that is unfortunate, but it is not the most critical thing. What is critical for Kosovo is recognition from other states, so that it can move towards NATO and the European Union. And that has become almost impossible as long as Serbia continues to reject this process. So, I think the current process is not legitimate, but I don’t see any other alternative at this point. It would probably have to be completely restarted if a new political opportunity opens up. And if a change happens in Serbia, then we would no longer talk about “dialogue”, but about real negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement. As we saw in the case of the settlement of relations between Macedonia and Greece, there were negotiations, agreements, ratification and then moving forward. The problem with the current dialogue is that it is just “dialogue” — it is not a process with a clear end. Therefore, if the political dynamics in Serbia change, a new approach would be needed: not an open dialogue without end, but a negotiation aimed at a final normalization agreement, with a clear contract and a defined implementation process, instead of this endless dialogue, which is not actually functioning as a dialogue.
Radio Kosovo: And how do you think domestic politics, both in Kosovo and Serbia, are shaping the pace and outcome of the dialogue process?
Florian Bieber: So, of course the domestic public influences the process, but at the same time the political actors themselves shape it. In Serbia it is very clear that the government has influenced public opinion. Society has become much more nationalistic and more anti-Kosovo and more against normalization than it was 13–14 years ago, when the Vučić government came to power. And this is not because people have simply changed their minds themselves, but because the government, through propaganda, has changed the political environment. Therefore, it is much more difficult now, and it will be even more difficult for the next government after Vučić to compromise and normalize relations, because the society is not prepared for this. Also in Kosovo, of course, Kurti has campaigned and in a way has succeeded in a less compromise-ready approach compared to previous governments. So, the parties have become more distant from each other, but I would not say that this is because of the citizens. It is more that governments have shaped society's expectations and, unfortunately, have pushed them even further apart. But I would say that the main responsibility falls on the Serbian government, which has influenced the citizens' departure from any idea of recognition and normalization, pushing them towards a more radical nationalist position.
Radio Kosovo: How do you assess the current role of the European Union in this dialogue, but also the engagement of the United States in political developments in Kosovo? Should they be more present in this process?
Florian Bieber: Honestly, I hope that the United States under Trump will be as little present in Kosovo or any country in the Balkans as possible, because they are not constructive actors. We have seen this during the first Trump presidency, even if Richard Grenell is now marginalized within the second Trump administration, as it seems. There is nothing positive that can come from a strong American engagement, because it would be mainly about Trump and not about Kosovo or Serbia, or about improving relations. In this sense, I hope that he does not “rediscover” or “rediscover” Kosovo and Serbia on the map.
Radio Kosovo: Is there a clear strategic alignment, I would say, between the EU and the US when it comes to Kosovo?
Florian Bieber: No, I mean we don't have a clear American policy on Kosovo, Serbia or the Western Balkans. There wasn't a clear policy even during Trump's first presidency, except for some quick deal. And I don't think we will have one, because it's simply not a priority and it's not on the agenda. Of course, Trump's presidency is based on personal power, personal enrichment and personal prestige of the president. Therefore, it can be influenced or "captured" by people with certain interests. But we don't see a clear American role at the moment. And it certainly won't support the EU, because in fact we have seen a rather hostile attitude towards the European Union from Trump. This has been shown by the statements of JD Vance and Marco Rubio, perhaps with lower intensity, but still in the same direction. So, relations between the EU and the US are broken, almost completely broken at the moment. And I don't see that this will help either in Kosovo or Serbia. Even the EU itself, at this moment, is pursuing a policy more of problem management than of striving for any progress or new momentum in the dialogue. So, the EU is simply trying to keep the process moving to avoid crises, instead of really and seriously implementing the previously signed agreements.
Radio Kosovo: So, do you think there is room for the EU, and perhaps even the US, to get more involved to help reduce political instability in Kosovo? What is your opinion on this issue?
Florian Bieber: I think the EU could be more engaged and should be more engaged, but I don’t think it is currently interested in this. As for the US, of course at the ambassadorial level there could be some role, but I don’t see it really happening. I don’t think the US has the credibility, nor the interest at this moment. Even if we talk about the ambassadorial level, they still need the support of the administration in every initiative, and I don’t see that this support exists. That’s why I think the US will not become a significant actor in this process under the Trump administration. While the EU could be, it also seems disinterested or distracted at this moment. In this sense, we are in a kind of political vacuum, when it comes to the two main external actors that have influenced in the past the support for Kosovo and the dialogue with Serbia.
Radio Kosovo: Do you think that this international engagement in Kosovo has previously been more stabilizing for the country or has it created long-term dependence?
Florian Bieber: Yes, I think it has been both at the same time. Because, of course, some of the engagement has created dependency and in some cases undermined democracy. The US, in particular, has sometimes — even under previous administrations — overstepped its role, being more imposing than negotiating. The EU has also not always been productive, for example with the special measures imposed on Kosovo and the way the dialogue has been structured. There have been structural shortcomings. So I think there are many problems in the past engagement, but at the same time that engagement has shown at least an attempt to improve relations and to give Kosovo international support and more weight in the dialogue. However, this has been weakening for years. This does not just start with the Trump administration — even under the Biden administration, American priorities regarding Serbia and Kosovo have changed. And both actors, both the EU and the US, have been less and less constructive for several years now.
Radio Kosovo: Mr. Florian, I would like to talk briefly about the dynamics in the Western Balkans. Do you see an increase in political fragmentation across the countries of the region?
Florian Bieber: Politically, if we look at it from the inside, there is a high level of polarization. We see this throughout the region: the oppositions are weak in Albania, in North Macedonia and in Serbia. And this is certainly a problem, because democratic competition becomes difficult. We do not have a maturation of political parties, but more polarization and often strengthening of dominant parties, which is not good for democracy in the region. So, I think this is one of the biggest challenges in the region in terms of domestic politics: we are not seeing democratic progress. Of course, we also need to see the impact of the changes in Hungary. I think that the loss of Viktor Orban would be an important signal for the region, especially for Serbia, and this could bring a positive dynamic. But the problem is that we do not have strong opposition parties in Serbia, but also in other countries. Therefore, a reconfiguration of politics is needed, including in Albania, where the opposition is very weak and discredited. This makes the power of prime ministers and ruling parties stronger, but it does not help democracy in the region.
Radio Kosovo: Do you think nationalist narratives are still shaping politics in the region today? Are they as active as they were before?
Florian Bieber: I think it depends on the country, of course, but in general nationalist narratives remain very strong. Especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia. I would say that both societies have become more nationalist through their governments over the last 15 years than they were in the 2000s, when the memory of the wars was fresher. And that will be a big challenge to address. Of course, this always creates reactions and strengthens nationalism in neighboring countries. We see this also in Croatia, where there is a noticeable increase in nationalist positions, even though Croatia is a member of the European Union and NATO and is not threatened by any of its neighbors. I think that this is part of a broader crisis of democracy and also creates space for populist nationalist ideas. And that, I believe, will remain one of the main challenges in the whole region.
Radio Kosovo: Do you think that regional instability in one Western Balkan country could cause wider political consequences in neighboring countries? For example, could Bosnia and Herzegovina remain a “hot spot,” or perhaps northern Kosovo?
Florian Bieber: In this sense, I am somewhat optimistic, not because things are good, but because we still have an international peacekeeping presence, such as KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have prevented any serious escalation. I also think that, despite all the nationalism, we do not see a readiness in the region for conflict. And this helps to reduce the risk. Of course, we have also seen in Bosnia the case where Milorad Dodik was convicted and forced to step down from the presidency. Although he remains politically influential, he has not brought the situation to open conflict. So I think there is no interest in uncontrolled conflict. There is more interest in a continuous state of crisis, and that is what we are seeing. This is bad enough in itself, but it is not a situation where the risk of open conflict is very high. Overall, the risk of conflict in the region remains relatively low.
Radio Kosovo: We have a very sensitive situation in the Middle East. How do you think this situation, although geographically distant, could indirectly affect the political and security dynamics in the Western Balkans?
Florian Bieber: I think the main impact is likely to be economic. The economic effects of the war in the Middle East are quite significant, not only for the countries directly involved, through rising prices, oil prices and other supplies, but also indirectly in the EU, where the costs of this war are also huge. This could once again boost the success of more populist parties, which can benefit from disillusioned voters who are facing economic difficulties. Economic crises are never good for democratic politics. So I think the impact will come mainly in this indirect way. Of course, the war is unpredictable and we do not know how it will end. We do not know how much further damage it will cause to the Euro-Atlantic relationship between the United States and Europe. We are seeing that relations between the EU and the US have been steadily deteriorating, and this could also be a consequence of this war. And of course, a complete collapse of NATO, for example, would have obvious consequences for the Western Balkans.
Radio Kosovo: So, do you see NATO disbanding as a possible scenario, or would that be more of a far-fetched scenario?
Florian Bieber: Yes, I think this has become conceivable, because the United States under Trump has become very unpredictable and quite anti-European. Meanwhile, in Europe there is a lot of resistance to Trump's positions. Of course, one can hope that reason will stop the worst step, namely the dissolution of NATO. But even if NATO does not officially dissolve, if, for example, the US says that it will not defend its allies, NATO may exist only on paper, but in practice no longer function properly. And I think this risk is not so small. And this, of course, could lead to a crisis that could be tested by Russia, or maybe even by Serbia. If external actors think that they can further weaken NATO, they would try. I think that at this moment, if Russia were to attack the Baltic states, this would still unite the US and the EU, and in fact strengthen NATO. But if NATO enters a deeper crisis, if EU-US relations deteriorate, then some external actor could try to test NATO. And if NATO does not react, then it would be practically dead.
Radio Kosovo: What are the main risks to democratic consolidation in Kosovo in the coming years? I don't want to sound hypothetical, but what do you see as the main risks in the near future?
Florian Bieber: I think the main risk is internal. And it is related to what we discussed earlier: if a recurring political crisis continues, with frequent elections, without a stable government and without clear decision-making for the president, this will of course harm democratic consolidation. This is a risk — the risk of instability similar to the “Bulgarian scenario”. The other risk is that Vetëvendosje becomes even more dominant, that is, as a result of further elections it wins an even larger share of the vote and completely dominates the presidency, the government and the institutions. Although a party may have good intentions, it is always dangerous when power is too concentrated in a single party and in a strong political leader. This can harm democracy, especially if the opposition is further weakened. And this is a regional trend: weak opposition often disintegrates, and this creates situations where one party becomes too dominant. This can also be harmful to democracy, because the risk of state capture and non-independent institutions increases. So, for Kosovo, I see two scenarios: one is the excessive dominance of a single party, and the other is a deadlocked situation leading to institutional crisis through repeated elections and short-lived governments.
Radio Kosovo: So, could these be scenarios or conditions where Kosovo could face deeper political polarization or perhaps institutional blockade?
Florian Bieber: Yes, I think this institutional polarization and the blockade is one scenario. And the other scenario is a system where one party dominates, and then Kosovo would be more like Albania in the sense that it would have a very dominant prime minister, without a strong political opposition. In such a situation, democratic consolidation would be weakened and the institutions would no longer be independent and would no longer really control the executive.
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