Written by: Agon Maliqi
The global attention to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat on April 12 has highlighted his outsized role on the world stage. During his sixteen years in office, the ideological crusader against Western liberalism has managed to leverage his country’s veto power in the European Union (EU) to exert effective pressure on much of Europe through strategic partnerships with Russia and China. More recently, Orbán has gained even more prominence due to his rapprochement with a US administration sympathetic to Hungary’s conservative domestic agenda and sovereignist stance against Brussels. Describing the international significance of Orbán’s ideological project, Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev likened the Hungarian leader to a Fidel Castro for the global right.
However, this global notoriety often overshadowed Orbán’s role as a regional hegemon and a conduit for Russian and Chinese influence in the Balkans. He never managed to build a sustainable illiberal axis within the EU or Central Europe, largely because his European partners did not have the same electoral success as he did. But he was perhaps most successful as a sponsor and enabler of an existing illiberal axis south of Hungary’s borders.
Over the past decade, Orbán used his control of the Hungarian state, as well as Russian and Chinese support, to build an infrastructure of influence in the Western Balkans to support his political allies—most notably Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. He also positioned Hungary as a gateway to the region’s path to EU membership, which, unlike Ukraine, he nominally supported. In this way, Orbán presented himself as a sponsor of like-minded regimes like Vučić’s, which he saw as tools to pressure Brussels or as future allies in a different kind of EU.
Orbán’s support for authoritarian leaders in the Balkans helped deepen the region’s democratic backsliding. At the same time, his efforts strengthened skepticism about enlargement among other EU member states, which became more wary of accepting new “Trojan horses” like Hungary. The significance of Péter Magyar’s electoral victory for the Western Balkans lies in the fact that his government will inherit Orbán’s regional diplomacy and veto over the accession process. This leadership transition is likely to have consequences for the Vučić regime in Belgrade, and perhaps even for the speed with which the Western Balkan countries and Ukraine join the EU.
Orbán's axis of strong leaders
The deep strategic cooperation between Orbán and Vučić was based on both ideological proximity and shared geopolitical interests to balance the West while accommodating Chinese and Russian interests. For example, the reception of Russian energy assets from Serbia played an important role in Orbán’s efforts to turn Hungary into a transit hub for Russian energy imports to Europe. This explains the strategic deals on gas and oil, as well as discussions on nuclear energy. Over the past decade, Vučić and Orbán have transformed their countries into Chinese manufacturing and trade hubs for European markets, including the construction of Chinese-funded railways and roads connecting the two countries to the port of Piraeus in Greece. Their importance to China became clear during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s last visit to Europe in 2024, when he chose Budapest and Belgrade as two of three stops, in addition to Paris.
The ties between Hungary and the Western Balkans also extended to extensive investments by Hungarian companies in strategic sectors of the region. For example, in Albania, IT company 4IG became a major player in telecommunications, Wizz Air a dominant airline, and OTP entered the banking sector. According to the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP), Hungarian foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans increased from 690 million euros in 2016 to 1.5 billion euros in 2020.
This deepening economic cooperation was accompanied by support for friendly regimes, including investments by Orbán loyalists in media outlets in North Macedonia and Slovenia. In 2018, Orbán granted asylum to Nikola Gruevski, the former prime minister of North Macedonia, who was facing corruption charges. He also shielded the separatist leader of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, from EU sanctions and financially supported his government when others withdrew. Orbán was even reportedly willing to use Hungarian peacekeeping forces to remove him from Bosnia and Herzegovina during Dodik’s clash with the judiciary.
Recent events suggest that this support may have been mutual. During a campaign in which Orbán criticized Ukraine, Vučić announced the discovery of explosives near a pipeline that supplies Hungary with Russian gas, hinting that Ukraine might be responsible. Magyar claimed that it was a “false flag” operation, while Serbian intelligence also seemed to distance itself from claims to preserve relations with the West.
What Magyar's victory means for the Western Balkans
Magyar came to power with an agenda focused largely on domestic issues such as corruption and the rule of law, which he is expected to prioritize as prime minister. In foreign policy, the main focus appears to be restoring relations with the EU and NATO. During the campaign, he stressed the need to “restore Hungary’s credibility… as a constructive and reliable partner contributing to a stronger Europe,” which is likely to start with unblocking EU aid to Ukraine.
However, in his first post-election press conference, the Western Balkans took center stage. He took a critical tone towards Vučić and announced an investigation into the alleged pipeline incident. He also suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin could be the figure behind the connections between Orbán, Vučić and Fico. Vučić reacted by calling these statements “stupid” and “thoughtless.”
Orbán’s defeat comes at a difficult time for Vučić domestically, with his popularity plummeting. It could affect the presidential elections scheduled for next spring and push him to delay early parliamentary elections. But the biggest impact is the weakening of his international position. Magyar’s victory also raises questions about the future of joint Serbia-Hungary projects, especially those related to Russian energy.
If Magyar tries to reduce Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy, Serbia will face even greater challenges in this regard and may be forced to move more quickly towards the West. Meanwhile, Croatia looks set to benefit, with plans to supply the region with non-Russian oil via the Adria Pipeline and American liquefied natural gas via the Southern Interconnector in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The positive developments following Magyar's victory could provide a temporary boost to EU enlargement. Although he has expressed skepticism about Ukraine's membership, his criticisms are mainly related to the pace of the process. The removal of a supporter of authoritarianism and the possibility of Hungary moving away from its problematic rule of law status strengthens Brussels' position towards the Western Balkan countries.
However, this political shift could quickly reveal the real positions of member states on enlargement. Without Hungary's veto as an excuse, skeptical countries could be forced to clarify their positions. Thus, Europe's credibility as a geopolitical actor could be tested, as larger states could be forced to give clear answers about the timing and conditions of enlargement.
The original version of the article was published in Atlantic Council
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