Written by: Adri Nurellari
Pro-Serbian parties in Montenegro attempted to restore the historical flag with red-blue-white stripes; a symbol directly linked to Serbian identity. This unsuccessful act was not aesthetic nostalgia but a well-calculated political move to rewrite state identity and challenge Podgorica's current geopolitical orientation through a symbolism that articulates submission to the Serbian sphere of influence.
The Montenegrin parliament fortunately did not put this proposal on the agenda. However, the attempt to restore the tricolor flag is not an isolated episode, but a clear signal that society and politics there are still deeply divided and polarized. On the one hand, a Montenegro that seeks to preserve its state identity and Euro-Atlantic course and on the other, there are forces that are trying to restore the historical narratives and symbolism that connect the country with Serbia and Russia.
Therefore, it should be noted that the attempt in question is not just a matter of symbols and pride but a tactic within the framework of hybrid warfare, an attempt to create internal tension, to drag out reforms and to sabotage or slow down integration into the European Union. In other words, we are not dealing with a debate over the design of the fabric, but a sophisticated tactic within the framework of hybrid warfare. The masters of these movements (which the KGB called “active measures”) aim to produce artificial internal tension in order to paralyze vital reforms, to prevent state consolidation and to sabotage integration into the European Union.
The attempt to change the Montenegrin flag fits the classic “Hybrid War” playbook, where the state is not hit with tanks from the outside, but rots through identity fragmentation from within, turning sovereignty into a battlefield of archaic cyclical emotions. Therefore, it is worth analyzing this type of war because it is not the first time. A similar scenario was used last decade, in an attempt to prevent North Macedonia and Montenegro from joining NATO. Instead of directly confronting the alliance, the actors opposing its expansion chose a smarter path; that of internal destabilization. In North Macedonia, this manifested itself through deep political crises and ethnic tensions that culminated in the Kumanovo case. In Montenegro, the attempted coup in 2016 was a more open and dangerous expression of the same model. The goal in both cases was clearly to create a chaotic internal reality that would make Euro-Atlantic integration impossible or at least delayed.
This model is not developing in isolation in Montenegro but we see it throughout the region today; even with great success. It must be understood that when politics shifts from economics to symbolism and from reforms to mythology, the Russian-Serbian game reaps its maximum success with our countries. We see this model in Kosovo, where the ongoing crises in the north and the tensions produced around parallel structures are part of the same logic of destabilization. Likewise in North Macedonia, where the political debate is diverted away from economics and integration reforms towards history and symbolism; as is being seen with the student protests. The same model is also operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in an even more institutionalized and dangerous form. Through ongoing political crises, threats of secession from Republika Srpska and the systematic blockage of state institutions, a deliberate paralysis of the state is being produced. Even there, we are dealing with a hybrid war in its purest form because the state is not attacked from outside, but is held hostage from within, through endless crises that make normal functioning almost impossible and Euro-Atlantic integration an increasingly distant illusion.
While we rejoice in Pristina or Tirana that we have purchased American Javelin anti-tank missiles; we find ourselves completely unarmed in the “gray zone war” or in the “non-linear war” as Valery Gerasimov, the chief of staff of the Russian army, calls it. His doctrine implies a strategy to weaken and destabilize a country without entering into open war, using political pressure, propaganda, disinformation, crime, blackmail, economics, espionage, manipulation and other non-military means. All of these are actions that do not cross the threshold of open war, that is, they do not enter into direct armed conflict, but are related to a reality where the border between peace and war becomes unclear.
And therein lies the greatest irony of our time. While countries in the region invest in classic defenses (weapons, equipment, military training) they often remain defenseless against these new forms of warfare. It is much easier to identify a tank than a narrative. It is much easier to defend against a physical attack than against a sophisticated disinformation operation.
This creates a dangerous asymmetry; where our countries are prepared for yesterday's war, but not for today's war.
The aim of this special war today is to turn the new Balkan states into countries that are no longer concerned with reforms, but with flags and symbols; not with economics, but with history. And this is precisely where the Russian-Serbian game succeeds; when you immerse a country in the endless labyrinths of debate about the past, you have effectively blocked its future.
Seen through this prism, it can be said that this cynical but effective hostile strategy is reaping great success in Kosovo today. The impasse over government formation that we had last year, the failure to elect a president, and the risk of early elections create an institutional vacuum ideal for intervention and destabilization, shifting attention from reforms and development to endless political crises that severely damage the international position.
Let's be clear, this is not an invitation to conspiracy and to say that every crisis is orchestrated from the outside and to imply that representatives of the political elite are placed in the service of hostile agencies. It is enough to understand that every internal crisis creates opportunities for external influence. Here it should also be clarified that often hybrid warfare does not create problems out of thin air but finds them where they exist and amplifies them. It does not build new conflicts but feeds and deepens existing ones, aiming for the state to begin to lose its ability to function effectively.
This is why this sophisticated form of gray war is so dangerous; because it is not perceived as war. There is no visible enemy in uniform, and without even realizing it, we can be our own worst enemies. This kind of war has no clear front, there is no moment when you can say “the war has begun” and the red line of the border has been crossed. But its effects are real, severe and long-lasting.
Apparently, in the modern world we live in, invasion has become somewhat out of fashion and extremely costly, and therefore it is much more efficient and convenient to convince a country to self-sabotage or self-paralyze. A little political poison, a little division and a lot of emotional identity noise are enough, and the system begins to block from within, without the need for soldiers' boots. Because this kind of war does not need spectacular victories, capitulation treaties or territorial annexation; it is enough that the opponent never understands that he has lost. Why would you need to invade a country when it is collapsing on its own, gradually and without realizing it.
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