If the Vetëvendosje Movement decides to give up on Vjosa Osmani's candidacy, the doors of the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Kosovo and the Democratic League of Kosovo will not be closed that night. Bottles will be opened. Restrained smiles will be distributed. The word "principle" will be articulated, but the word "victory" will be implied.
Because a rift between Albin Kurti and Osmani will not be read as an institutional debate. It will be read as confirmation of a long-standing narrative: that Kurti is not a man of his word, that he consumes allies, that he burns partners as soon as they gain weight. It matters little whether this is true or not. In politics, perception is an operative fact. And this perception will be used mercilessly.
PDK means: “We told you so.”
LDK means: “We knew.”
And a portion of the electorate that has switched from LDK to LVV in the last six years will begin to wonder whether the emotional stability of the reformist camp is sustainable.
The LDK has cold reasons to want this rift. A Kurti-Osmani split creates space for a comeback. A disillusioned voter seeks a home. And the LDK will offer the old home, with the promise of prudence and balance.
But serious politics is not done to please opponents. It is done to preserve strategic interests.
Today, Osmani is the only political figure in Kosovo who has managed to build real and functional credibility in Washington. Not symbolic. Not ceremonial. But functional. At a time when Serbian lobbying in the American capital is organized, financed, and ruthless, giving up the figure who neutralizes that lobbying is not a tactical act. It is a dangerous luxury.
It is paradoxical that precisely PDK, LDK and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo – parties that for years have articulated their proximity to Washington as political capital – do not support the re-election of a president who actually has access and credibility there. If the criterion is the interest of the state, then support should be natural. If the criterion is party calculation, then we will hear a lot of talk about “institutional balance”.
As for the threats of new elections – let's be serious. Polls put LDK below 10%. PDK has a stable, but not growing, electorate. AAK remains a limited factor. Soap bubbles are beautiful until they burst. Then there is air.
Deputies must also clearly read the constitutional standard. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo has determined not only the minimum quorum of 80 deputies participating in the vote, but also the obligation to vote – for, against or abstain. Boycott is not a heroic act. It is evasion of responsibility.
If someone thinks that the way to block Osman's re-election is to not stay in the hall, then let's do the battle openly. Let's go to the elections. Let's face a list where Kurti is number one and Osman is number two. And let's see how 61% turns into a new electoral reality.