Written by: Paskal Milo
Everyone acknowledges that today the international order is in crisis. The pillars on which it was built after World War II have shaken. The end of the Cold War brought changes in the balance of power within the international system, but they did not fundamentally undermine its foundations, at least not in the 20-25 years that followed.
Global political, economic, social, climatic, environmental and technological developments and phenomena have gradually brought about numerous structural and normative challenges, the crisis of the liberal order, the shift of global power, the return of rivalries between great powers and the weakening of multilateralism. Today, two trends are clashing in the world: that between the universal normative and hegemonic order and that of competitive pluralism without a normative center. Major international actors are acting partially and still within the framework of the weakened international liberal order in order to adapt, to preserve old positions and why not even to strengthen them. What is noticeable is the speed of the pace of change in reality and the need to break away from traditional phlegmatic and bureaucratic policies in dealing with them.
The return of President Donald Trump to the White House, his aggressive political technology in international relations, marked a tectonic movement in the global stratification that will bring about vertical and horizontal shifts in the power plates of the main international actors. The new National Security Strategy of the 'Trump' administration, announced at the end of last year, the military intervention in Venezuela, the platform of the "Peace Board", accompanied by threatening statements against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of several other countries at the beginning of this year, as well as the withdrawal of the United States from 31 international organizations of the United Nations system, clearly demonstrate the intention to remodel the international order or to adapt it to American interests.
It is natural that the international order after the Second World War or even after the Cold War cannot remain static, it has reflected and will be influenced by the dynamics of comprehensive international developments. The international order is a long-term collective investment of the main international actors and as such it has a multidimensional institutional architecture. Its change cannot be imposed unilaterally or in a “revolutionary” way. It can be done step by step and through multilateral decision-making. In the world today there are many potential dormant and frozen conflicts, unresolved national issues, but also bilateral territorial claims or against third parties. They are not resolved through force because they would have a domino effect in different regions and countries of the world.
The international order has been built and has functioned on the basis of several principles that underlie it and that shape the corpus of international law. Their respect, even if imperfect, such as the preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and the peaceful resolution of disputes, has avoided major conflicts on a global scale.
The major actors of international politics, but also the medium-sized ones, have elaborated their strategies for the international order, which have at their center the protection of national interests according to traditional historical perceptions, but also modern and current approaches dictated by regional and international developments. This issue took on a new dynamic with the second administration of President Trump in the White House.
The strategy of American administrations has always been built in the form of concentric circles, where investments and influence have been dependent on the radius of distance from the center, but sometimes with exceptions motivated by the political and ideological confrontations of the Cold War. The main differences between the strategies of Republican and Democratic administrations have been more in the methods and means used than in objectives and interests. The former have used more force and open intervention, while the latter have generally been more inclined towards “soft power” and the use of instruments of liberal democracy.
The new National Security Strategy of the Republican administration of President Trump marks a fundamental shift in the international policy of the United States. Its objective, summarized in two words, is: “America first,” which means maintaining and strengthening American hegemony in the economy, technology, and military power. Combined with the newly announced platform of the “Peace Board,” the new American Strategy moves the United States away from an international order based on multilateral institutions toward a new model with fewer global commitments and a focus on competition that guarantees more security and leadership in all areas.
Under current conditions, the new American strategy has been designed with business logic to reduce the economic and military weight of engagement in issues and regions that are not seen as priorities and to orient and focus on where greater interests and benefits are at stake. In its function, the United States is shifting the axis of its strategy away from Euro-Atlanticism, is withdrawing from the priority of its relations with Europe, is redefining financial and security contributions to allies within NATO, and is attempting to end the four-year Russian-Ukrainian war.
In the strategic vision of President Trump's administration for the revision of the international order and related to it of the American leadership, old doctrines and projects have resurfaced. It is no coincidence that the "Monroe Doctrine" of the early 19th century was revived, which preceded the military intervention in Venezuela and threatening statements addressed to other Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, etc.. The same logic should be used to view President Trump's statements addressed to Canada to integrate as a state within the American Federation or even further those regarding the occupation of Greenland.
There is an increased interest of the current American administration beyond the traditional engagement of the United States in the Middle East. This was clearly demonstrated in the support of Israel in the war in Gaza to eliminate the terrorist organization Hamas and to release Israeli hostages, in the strikes to annihilate other terrorist organizations in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, etc. But above all, this new policy of American military intervention was manifested in the intensive bombing of Iran's nuclear infrastructure at the end of last summer and in the great pressures that have been and are being exerted on the authorities of the Tehran regime to dictate an agreement not only to stop its nuclear ambition, but also to make it less threatening to American interests and those of its allies in the region.
It is well known that the primary focus of US strategy is currently on the Indo-Pacific region, where China is seen as a strategic/systemic competitor. The objective is to contain it, to limit its economic, technological and military growth, and to limit its influence in the world, especially in the Global South.
China is a global power, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a significant player in the entire system of major international organizations. As such, it is very sensitive to international developments, including the most recent ones in Venezuela, the Middle East and Iran. Its status as a great power with broad strategic interests at a time when the international order is in crisis has legitimized it to play an active role in efforts to reform it and find new, functional balances to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.
China has its own vision for international order, known as the “Global Governance” Initiative, which is an alternative to other existing models in circulation. This platform has Chinese characteristics, has original elements that converge with ideas and views of other strategies, but also distinguish them.
Global Governance places state sovereignty at the center of the international order and defends the principle that every state has the right to choose its own political system and development path. According to it, China does not aim to overthrow the existing international order, but to redefine it, gradually transforming it towards a multipolar order, creating a world with many centers of power, inclusive and cooperative, without the hegemonic role of any power and reflecting the new realities of power.
In the Chinese approach, economic development is seen as an essential condition for international stability, security and peace. For its implementation, it offers concrete instruments such as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, conceived as a global infrastructure and development platform, the creation of alternative financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as global thematic initiatives such as those on Global Development, Global Security and Global Civilizations.
The Chinese vision of the international order is also closely aligned with the Russian platform around it. Both countries share common positions that oppose American hegemony in the current international order, the overestimation of force at the expense of respect for international law, the inviolability of state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, the right of each country to choose its own path of development, and international legal equality. Both China and Russia seek a multilateral order in which there are multiple centers of power and a balance of sovereign states with equal interests, where current international institutions, especially the UN, remain central but reflect the new realities of power and the representation of countries of the Global South. The Russian and Chinese visions of the international order represent a tactical convergence, but not a full normative identity. There are differences between them regarding the normative dimension of the international order, the relationship with sovereignty, multilateralism, development, and the approach to overcoming the crisis.
Another major international actor alongside the United States, China, and Russia is the European Union. It has a different vision, different from the previous ones, but also with common elements. At its center are three main concepts: effective multilateralism, normative power, and strategic autonomy.
The EU acknowledges that the liberal international order is in crisis today, but does not reject it and calls for its reform. It opposes American unilateralism (hegemony), but also rejects its alternatives. Effective European multilateralism means strengthening the UN and not replacing it with other alternatives, as the “Peace Board” has recently been mentioned, more equitable representation of the Global South, consolidation and respect for international law, functional and legitimate institutions, and collective solutions to global crises.
The EU conceives of the international order as a system of legal norms, international agreements and common institutions. It is for moderate universalism, for an order based on rules that serve as a source of legitimacy and not as an instrument of power. This makes the EU a normative actor, not a revolutionary one.
The role of the European Union for the future of the international order is closely linked to its strategic autonomy. Its well-known weaknesses, such as a lack of political cohesion, limited military capabilities, strategic dependence on the United States, and its limited influence in major geopolitical crises, have called into question its ability to articulate its alternative in world affairs.
Dealing with the latest international developments such as the war in Ukraine, the conflicts in Gaza, the rise in tensions in the Middle East and Iran, the American intervention in Venezuela, and the language of open pressure on the European territory of Greenland and several other Latin American countries by President Trump seems to have shaken the European countries of the EU and NATO to think and act critically and strategically.
Recent statements by European leaders about building a "new independent Europe", large defense spending, active solidarity by some of them towards a ceasefire and peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and on the Greenland issue, important trade agreements signed with MERCOSUR in Latin America and with India, as well as high-level meetings of some of them in China, all indicate signals of a growing dimension of European global politics.
In the strategic competition of major international actors, countries considered to be middle powers also play an important role. Among them, India is a state in transition to a great power, which has its own concept of international order, which has points of convergence but also differences from other platforms on this issue. India's official institutional approach to international order is a combination of reformist multilateralism, strategic autonomy that rejects participation in military alliances or domination by a single power. It is for distributed partnerships in accordance with national interests and thematic interests as an opportunity for its global expansion. For India, issues such as climate, security, migration, trade and technology are global, interdependent and interconnected that require collective solutions. It is for a more comprehensive rules-based international order that reflects the realities of the 21st century.
There are many other countries that, based on three sets of criteria (material, functional and normative), are classified as middle powers in the world, such as the largest countries of the European Union, Turkey, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc. Some of them are considered “classical” middle powers, others “rising” middle powers, and the European group within the EU framework as normative/institutional middle powers. They are not peripheral actors but functional pillars of the contemporary international order, its stabilizers, supporters of multilateral institutions, limiters of the hegemony of a single power, mediators in regional conflicts, facilitators in dialogue between great powers, but also bearers of strategic autonomy.
At the Davos Economic Forum in January, the prime minister of one of these countries, Canada, Mark Carney, appeared to speak for most of them when he delivered his government’s keynote speech on the current international order. He concluded that this rules-based order was over, that the world today was characterized by intense competition between great powers, and called for cooperation among middle powers to create a “third way,” and to build pragmatic, functional coalitions rather than rigid alliances based on a single power.
The competing or complementary visions that were analyzed show that the future international order will be neither unique nor universal, but a competing coexistence of different models, a pluralistic multipolar system.
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