The influence of Russian propaganda in the Western Balkans is neither new nor unknown. For years, European institutions and civil society organizations have been warning about the destabilizing role that Moscow plays in the region, especially in countries aspiring to join the European Union. North Macedonia, a NATO member since 2020 and a candidate country for the EU, is no exception to this dynamic, as are several other Western Balkan countries, with Serbia at the forefront.
In this context, recent political developments in Skopje have increased concerns about the country's European integration path. The current government and Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski have shown no willingness to accelerate key reforms, especially constitutional amendments, despite promises made during the election campaign. The promise that these changes would be voted on within six months of taking office remained unfulfilled.
On January 29, Prime Minister Mickoski was categorical: “There will be no constitutional changes as long as I am prime minister, unless at least two conditions are met,” he declared, citing the issue of the rights of the Macedonian community in Bulgaria and guaranteeing that “there will be no bilateral veto, belittling and humiliation for subjective reasons.”
According to political scientist Murat Ali, a professor at Mother Teresa University in Skopje, the delay in constitutional changes and this situation reflect more internal political dynamics than direct Russian influence. However, the geopolitical consequences are inevitable.
"Any delay in constitutional changes also means postponing the country's accession process to the European Union. And the further away the perspective of EU membership, the greater the space for the influence of third actors, including Russia. In this sense, Russian influence is not necessarily the cause of the blockade, but its beneficiary," Aliu emphasizes.
A crucial element often overlooked in analyses of foreign influence is the fact that propaganda does not work without a ready ground. No foreign power can impose its influence without a section of society or local elites who are willing to accept it. Influence is not military conquest, but a voluntary relationship between the one who offers the narrative and the one who embraces it.
In the case of the Balkans, the accumulated frustration with the long and conditional integration processes has created space for alternative discourses. This is where the Russian narrative comes in.
Moscow has systematically used information manipulation as a foreign policy tool. Known as “information warfare” apo "Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference", this approach goes beyond traditional diplomacy, targeting emotions, identity, and social insecurities. Some experts see this as a phenomenon of hybrid warfare, where information is used as a tool of political and social influence.
In North Macedonia, Russian propaganda relies on several recurring narratives: Russia is presented as a defender of traditional values, Orthodox identity, and Pan-Slavism, while the West is portrayed as a “liberal” force that imposes conditions and violates national identity. Changing the country’s name, demands for constitutional changes, and respect for minority rights are often presented as “humiliations” by the EU.
According to Petrit Saraçini from the Institute for Media and Analytics, religious and traditional sentiments are an important instrument in this influence strategy. “Church structures and so-called civic initiatives are used as intermediary channels to feed narratives against the 'degenerate' West,” says Saraçini.
Pro-Russian narratives are not only found in the media. They also find echoes in local politics. Parties like Levica have openly expressed anti-NATO and anti-EU stances, while entities like Janko Baçev's "United Macedonia" promote rapprochement with Russia and rejection of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Even within the executive branch, there are figures known for close ties to Moscow. Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Stoilković, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs, has participated in Russian security forums, where he has promoted bilateral cooperation.
These concerns were also reflected in the European Parliament Report of June 26, 2025. Rapporteur Thomas Waitz warned about the influence of the so-called "Serbian world" concept, supported by government representatives and closely linked to Russian and Chinese interests in the region.
Research shows that Russian propaganda is spread primarily through media outlets that rebroadcast content from Sputnik Serbia, RT Serbia, and Serbian tabloids, which are then adapted for the Macedonian public. Various social media platforms serve as amplifiers of these narratives.
"Facebook, X and Telegram in particular are used by the Russian embassy in Skopje and are empowered by bot farms to spread disinformation, especially regarding Russian aggression in Ukraine and so-called "traditional values"," emphasizes Saraçini.
The goal is not to completely dominate public discourse, but to fragment informational reality, create confusion, and weaken faith in democracy.
Although Russian influence in North Macedonia is not currently dominant, it poses a real risk. Propaganda creates illusions, fuels ethnic and religious polarization, undermines trust in institutions, and slows down European integration processes.
Tackling this phenomenon requires professional media, institutional transparency, media education, and legal regulation of media ownership and financing. The fight against disinformation is not censorship, but the protection of public space from the misuse of freedom of expression.
In the end, the choice remains political and social: Europe as a project of reforms and standards, or the illusion of an alternative that offers neither development nor security. /DW
edition
t7 live
