Written by: Sylë Ukshini
Concerned about the course of the Conference and the possibility of rejection of the agreement by the Kosovo delegation, the writer Ismail Kadare decided to be involved in the course of the Conference, sending an important, emotional, even reprimanding letter to the Kosovo delegation in Rombouillet Castle. On the other hand, the situation on the ground was dramatic, the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing was continuing without interruption. He didn't have trouble or thirst for glory, but he wanted Kosovo not to be left at the mercy of fate. Kadareja wrote the letter after a sleepless night, between two and four in the morning on February 22, 1999, being aware of the historical importance of that moment and the delicate moment in which the Albanian people of Kosovo were.
25 years ago, on February 6, 1999, the Rambouillet Conference began, which was held near Paris, France, aimed at a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. The initiator of the conference, which lasted until February 23, was the Contact Group, while the mediators were Christopher Hill from the USA, Boris Maiorsky, from Russia and Wolfgang Petritsch from the EU. Despite the reluctance due to the presence of representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Rambouillet, Belgrade decided to participate in the conference and accept "non-negotiable principles" during the conference process. But Milosevic refused to participate in Rambouillet. The government in Belgrade hoped to extract concessions, hoping that NATO would lack the resolve to use military force against Serbian military targets. On the other hand, the Kosovo delegation demonstrated constructive engagement during the course of the conference, but was not in a position to accept any solution. However, the final outcome of the first phase of the Rambouillet Conference was unclear. The Kosovo delegation insisted on the right of Kosovo's referendum after the end of the three-year transitional phase, while Belgrade rejected the military annexation, respectively the deployment of NATO troops.
In an attempt to save the negotiation process for addressing the status of Kosovo, the three mediators of the Rambouillet Conference (France), ambassadors Hill, Majorki and Petritsch (EU), on February 20, 1999 forwarded the proposal to the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group , who decided to postpone the conference until February 23. During this time when the situation was honest, the Serbian side refused the military annex of the agreement, while the Kosovo delegation was reluctant. American Secretary of State Medeline Albright was making maximum efforts to convince the Albanian side to accept the agreement, but she was not succeeding. However, at one point she bluntly slammed the solution formula on the table to the Kosovars: "Either sign now and then Yugoslavia will be bombed, or don't accept it and no one will help you!"
When the chairman of the conference, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and the EU's chief mediator, Wolfgang Pertritsch, pounced on KLA political leader Hashim Thaçi to get his approval on the main issue, he was almost out of the question. because of his extremely loud voice from nervousness. The continuation or end of the life of the powerful military wing of the KLA depended on his decision. That's how it happened to Thaçi before a very difficult dilemma. On the one hand, the pressure of international mediators increased excessively. And on the other hand, of course, the KLA military was not ready and determined to accept the dissolution of the KLA.
The situation had become tense. For a moment, attention was focused almost entirely on the Albanian side of Kosovo. During the night of February 21-22, EU and US mediators and their groups, through successive talks with the Kosovar and Serbian sides, tried to reach their approval of the text of the political agreement. But the rigid position of the Kosovars on the referendum issue did not change.
It became increasingly clear that the real reason for the Kosovar intransigence was the dissolution of the KLA, as foreseen in the Rambouillet agreement. As Wolfgang Petrisch, Karl Kaser and Robert Pichler write in their book “Kosovo – Mythen, Daten, Fakten”, in those days an unexpected development had taken place within the KLA, which, on the initiative of the political representative Adem Demaçi, had appointed Sylejman Sylejman, commander of the KLA. As a result, Demaçi declared that the KLA no longer felt represented by the people who were conducting the talks in Rambouillet. A tense situation had been created inside the Rambouillet castle, both within the ranks of the Kosovo delegation and among the international mediators, who had left no stone unturned in order to save the Rambouillet Conference from failure.
At half past nine I call the ambassador of Albania, Luan Rama. He immediately leaves for my house to get the letter. While the ambassador is on the way, surprisingly, Rexhep Qosja calls me. I tell him what I think in a tone that must be nervous. I also tell him that in ten minutes I am starting a letter to the delegation. In the photo: Ismail Kadare in his apartment in Paris, October 2008
In this circumstance, there was very little space and time left at the same time for reaching a compromise. The rejection of the agreement by the Kosovar side would also save the Milosevic regime from military punishment by NATO. Or what would happen if he let go at the last moment.
In these critical moments, the world-renowned writer Ismail Kadare, who at that time lived in Paris and who enjoyed the great respect of the Albanians of Kosovo, could not sit idly by, he decided to be involved remotely in the Rambouillet Conference, which presented the highest degree of internationalization of the Kosovo cause.
Concerned about the course of the Conference and the possibility of the rejection of the agreement by the Kosovo delegation, the writer Ismail Kadare decided to be involved in the course of the Conference, sending an important, emotional, even reprimanding letter to the Kosovo delegation in Rombouillet Castle. On the other hand, the situation on the ground was dramatic, the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing was continuing without interruption. He didn't have trouble or thirst for glory, but he wanted Kosovo not to be left at the mercy of fate. It was time to act to save the Rambouillet Conference in France, begging them to accept the Ismail Kadare Agreement, being a writer committed to Kosovo, he was worried about the news coming from inside the castle that the Kosovo delegation might rejected the agreement. On the other hand, the situation on the ground was dramatic, the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing was continuing without interruption. He didn't have trouble or thirst for glory, but he wanted Kosovo not to be left at the mercy of fate. It was time to act to save the Rambouillet Conference in France as the best solution for the moment.
"You are there for freedom, that is, for the life of Kosovo and not for its death" and any rejection of the Rambouillet agreement would be a "great gift for Belgrade", said Kadare. On the other hand, the groups of Albanians in exile were putting pressure on the Kosovo delegation with demands that they reject the temporary political solution offered by the Contact Group.
In this letter, Kadare drew attention to the Albanian delegation of Kosovo not to fall into the Serbian trap, which followed a strategy to make the Albanians complicit, even guilty, in order to escape the military punishment of the West. He further underlined that with the Rambouillet Conference the interest in Kosovo had increased to the maximum point, drawing attention that this interest and this seriousness of the international deployment centers could not be repeated. Therefore, he called for the Kosovo delegation to say "yes" to the agreement, because the Serbian side was eagerly waiting for a "no" from the Albanians, which would actually be a great gift for Belgrade. Preoccupied and understanding of the hesitation of the leaders of the Kosovo delegation, Kadare emphasized that at the moment Rambouillet was the only possible one, but at the same time clarified that another conference after three years leaves the door of freedom open.
Kadare drafted the letter after a sleepless night, between two and four in the morning of February 22, 1999, being aware of the historical importance of that moment and the delicate moment in which the Albanian people of Kosovo were. It was a dramatic situation, Kadare was thinking that he did not have enough time for a meeting with President Chirac or Ambassador Hill. The idea of the letter seemed to him the only solution. It was a letter that was intended to force some to forget the rhapsody of the village… "At nine in the morning Elena starts typing the letter on the computer. At half past nine I call the Albanian ambassador, Luan Rama. He immediately leaves for my house to receive the letter. While the ambassador is on the road, surprisingly, Rexhep Qosja calls me. I tell him what I think in a tone that must be nervous. I also tell him that in ten minutes I am sending a letter to the delegation. I write a cover letter for Rexhep with more or less the same thoughts.
The ambassador promises me that in an hour the letter will be in the hands of the delegation", Kadare wrote in his diary. With this letter, the writer Ismail Kadare, starting from the importance and historical moment as well as from the fear that Kosovo could go downhill, decided to take the responsibility upon himself.
In this letter, Kadare also assured the Kosovo delegation that "as a writer, I would never dare to give you this advice, if I myself had the slightest fear that I was committing a crime that would weigh heavily on my conscience and biography ".
Addressing him with this letter, Kadare pointed out his readiness to defend these positions publicly and with him to defend the decision of the Kosovo delegation to accept the Rambouillet Agreement at this delicate moment for the Albanian people of Kosovo. And at the very end, in the form of an alarm, Kadare begged the members of the Kosovo delegation to "not listen to the irresponsible brats, who find it easy to shout: oh independence immediately, oh let's become ashes. No one has the right to propose death and destruction to his own people. You are there for freedom, that is, for the life of Kosovo and not for its death".
According to the Austrian ambassador, Wolfgangan Petrisch, Kadare's letter achieved the desired goal. Qosja, who pathetically read her text in front of the Kosovar delegation, gave up his non-accepting stance. However, the greatest pressure came from the local commanders of the KLA, who did not accept its dissolution without guarantees for the independence of Kosovo. For Thaci, not only the political fate of "his country" was at stake, but also his physical survival. If he decided to sign the agreement in the version presented, he could very easily become a "traitor". He knew that in military terms such a thing meant death. On the other hand, Thaçi was in danger of losing all the sympathy of the West. While the US made it clear that, in case the talks failed due to the fault of the Kosovars, this would be the end of the KLA.
On the other hand, says Petritsch, in Belgrade they knew very well that the only way to escape the NATO attack without signing the document was to break up the Kosovo delegation.
In these circumstances, Ismail Kadare's letter, which was the idea of ambassador Wolfgang Petrisch, was full of feeling addressed in particular to fellow writer Rexhep Qosja, who, together with Thaçi, was the fiercest opponent of the compromise project, it is said, among other things in the book "Kosova - Mythen, Daten, Fakten", by Wolfgang Petrisch, Karl Kaser and Robert Pichler
In this critical and decisive moment, the Kosovar delegation was not divided thanks to Veton Surroi, who tried together with Hilli and Petritsch to find a compromise solution. While Kadare's letter had a decisive impact on the representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army, a historical unity was achieved within the delegation in favor of accepting the Rambouillet Agreement. As a result, on February 23, 1999, the Kosovo delegation informed the head of the Rambouillet Conference that it had voted in favor of the agreement. But it must also be said that even after Rambouillet, Kadare was a powerful voice in support of the cause of Kosovo in the international arena, as he was more than just a writer, he knew well the ins and outs of European diplomacy, which he also did not hesitate to criticize him, when he was about to do so. He did not hesitate to criticize some world media for fabricating the crimes of the KLA.
"It has been a long time since anti-Albanian racism has taken place in Europe, not only in disturbing news, but in books, films and endless urban narratives. Of course, part of the blame falls on the Albanians themselves. Our bad thing is to ignore completely unfair, but extremely damaging accusations", Kadare wrote shortly after the accusations of the former Swiss senator, Dick Marty, were made public. In fact, he was among the first, who immediately after the war, had warned him that the Serbian propaganda, together with their friends, had launched a campaign to reverse the truth of what had happened in Kosovo. He spoke loudly against the symmetrization of crime.
And when Kosovo needed support, Kadare, like no other Albanian intellectual, together with a group of French intellectuals, signed an appeal in the spring of 1999, through which he requested the arming of the KLA.
"If NATO does not want to intervene with ground troops, because it wants to protect the lives of its soldiers - well. But there are others who are ready to risk their lives", declared Kadareja in an interview for the German daily "Der Tagesspiegel", (1. 6. 1999), at the moment when within NATO member countries discussions had begun whether or not to intervene with ground forces in the war for Kosovo.
And precisely this political and international commitment of Kadare for Kosovo, was magnificent and emancipating, not only for the Albanian public, but first of all, for the international public as well. Kadare's decades of unwavering support for the Kosovo cause, and subsequent support of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo's war and independence, probably denied him the opportunity to win the Nobel Prize for Literature, for which he was proposed several times. This may just be an opinion, but if it is true, then it is more a comment on the Nobel Prize for literature than on Kadare.
You are there for freedom, that is, for the life of Kosovo and not for its death
From your wisdom, bravery, honesty, along with the fate of Kosovo, the destinies of human lives depend, the lives of women, children, and men. In this case, I would like to repeat that making a concession when it has to be made is as much bravery and heroism as when you are at war. Please don't listen to the irresponsible brats, who find it easy to shout: oh independence immediately, oh let's become scum! No one has the right to propose death and destruction to his own people. You are there for freedom, that is, for the life of Kosovo and not for its death
Ismail Kadare
Paris, February 22, 1999
In the inability to verbally tell you some of my thoughts about what is happening and what the entire Albanian nation is expecting from you, allow me to address you with this short letter. A concern of the last few hours was the impetus for this letter, and especially Madeleine Albright's statement that:
a) if both parties do not agree there will be no military intervention in Yugoslavia,
b) if Albanians become the cause of failure, help to them will be expected.
I believe I am able to distinguish between statements that are made under pressure and those that express a deeper truth. From the information I have and from an alarming intuition, I am convinced that the statement of the US Secretary of State should be taken with the utmost seriousness.
In both cases, that is, even if both sides, Serbian and Albanian, do not agree, and especially in the second case, if the fault remains with the Albanians, the Serbs win. And in both cases, the Albanians come out lost. Apparently, the Serbian strategy is based on exactly this trap: to make the Albanians complicit, even guilty and get away with it. Serbs have nothing more to ask for from this conference. It will be a great victory for them. I think that this is enough to understand that under no circumstances should the Albanian delegation fall into a trap.
The dramatic question that arises is: although our aspiration is greater, can we still be satisfied with what we have gained? Could more be achieved from a first transitional phase of three years?
I think we can leave it at that for now. I think one could hardly get more out of a transitional phase.
This is a great chance for the Albanian people of Kosovo and the entire Albanian nation. History has shown many times that not every war, no matter how heroic, brings such a chance. And chances don't repeat themselves so easily. I am convinced that this chance should never be missed.
My conviction is based on the fact that world interest in Kosovo has reached its maximum point. Never again in the future can this interest, this preoccupation, this seriousness be sated. Even now, this interest has started to be called excessive and has awakened the jealousy of some countries and peoples.
Consequently, after this attention is spent, even greater massacres in Kosovo will attract much less attention.
The world will call it high consciousness and this will be fatal for Kosovo. I am sure that the Serbs are looking forward to the Albanian "no". There can be no greater gift for them.
In these conditions, I think that what can be taken should be taken and not be asked for the impossible for now. Another conference on Kosovo after three years leaves the door of freedom open. I understand your sense of responsibility, I understand your shyness not to make any concessions that should not be made. In this case, let me remind you that I, as a writer, would never dare to give you this advice, if I myself had the slightest fear that I was making a mistake that would weigh heavily on my conscience and biography mine. Addressing this letter, I am ready to defend my opinions publicly, in front of anyone and with him, to defend your decision to the end.
Today, you represent the Albanian people of Kosovo at the most delicate moment. From your wisdom, bravery, honesty, along with the fate of Kosovo, the destinies of human lives depend, the lives of women, children, and men. In this case, I wanted to repeat that, making a concession when it has to be made, is as much bravery and heroism as when you are at war. Please don't listen to the irresponsible brats, who find it easy to shout: oh independence immediately, oh let's become scum! No one has the right to propose death and destruction to his own people. You are there for freedom, that is, for the life of Kosovo and not for its death.
My warmest greetings, and the hope that you will understand me correctly.
edition
t7 live
