Written by Enver Hasani
For this reason, the “dissolution” on March 5 served Kurti’s interests, providing him with arguments to advance the destruction of the constitutional order through quasi-constitutional means. The president’s unconstitutional decree created ground for Kurti’s populist rhetoric and practice, with the aim of capturing central institutions..
Theoretical dimension: populism and personalist autocracies
In the analysis of rhetoric and political behavior, a sad similarity appears between some of the speeches of former Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, documented in the book Years of unraveling, and the rhetoric of the leader of the Vetëvendosje Movement, Albin Kurti. In some respects, this rhetoric is also reminiscent of the discourse of Benito Mussolini, the Italian of the early 20th century, who had roots in the socialist tradition. The essence of this logic is the idea that “institutionally or not, what matters is that the people like it”, often reducing the perception of “the people” to the will of the leader.
These forms of government are described in contemporary literature as personalist politics. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt in How Democracies Die, modern democracies are rarely overthrown through coups; they are gradually eroded by elected populist leaders who weaken institutions, delegitimize the opposition, and change the rules to maintain power. Jan-Werner Müller in What is Populism? emphasizes that the essence of this “populist manual” is the claim that only they represent the “real people,” thus justifying the exclusion of opponents and the weakening of pluralism. Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, in the book How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, explain that populists do not immediately overthrow the constitution; they gradually empty it from within by weakening controlling institutions, capturing the administration and independent bodies, and changing procedural rules to weaken the opposition.
These theoretical models, documented by the aforementioned authors, are a clear guide to understanding the experience in Kosovo and Kurti's behavior, placing the concrete case within the global and historical context of personalist populism.
The problem is deeply political, not constitutional.
This is the second year that Kosovo is entering with uncertainty about itself and its institutional sustainability. The genesis of this problem is related to the policies of the ruling party, which are based on a left-wing populist approach. These policies have gradually accumulated, like an avalanche, since the entry of the Vetëvendosje Movement into the Kosovo Assembly. The basic idea of this approach is to systematically challenge and demolish the institutional and normative obstacles that appear on the path to full control of the state mechanisms.
In its first term, VV managed to capture or paralyze a large part of the administrative apparatus, including independent agencies and institutions. The second term, judging by the behavior of the government from February 2025 onwards, seems to have been reserved for the complete capture of other organs of the state: the judiciary, the justice system and the balancing body of powers – the Presidency.
The saw hit a serious nail.
When he took full power in February 2021, almost all political circumstances paved the way for Kurti. Some supported the hope of fighting corruption and improving the country's situation, others expected the disappearance of informal decision-making, while some considered an untested policy as a new opportunity. The silent consensus was that his arrival would open a new page for the country.
These expectations began to fade in the first years of government, when scandals similar to those of the past emerged, but with one difference: corruption and mismanagement appeared as widespread chaos, without clear accountability. The February 2025 elections revealed another dimension of Kurti’s political project: total domination of the political system. Populist rhetoric and state resources were used to increase electoral support and enable the capture of central institutions.
The opposition's reaction during this process was insufficient. Some leaders did not yet perceive the danger, influenced also by Kurti's tactical approaches and promises of co-government or sharing of resources after the next elections. The situation changed when it became clear that the aim was to subjugate even the Presidency, the most balancing institution of the constitutional system.
Fighting personalist populism through usurpation of powers
On March 5, 2026, President Vjosa Osmani decided to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly, based on the claim of its inability to elect a new head of state. Many interpretations were based solely on the text of the article on the election of the president 30 days before the end of the mandate, but this clearly does not give the president the power to autonomously dissolve the parliament. In a parliamentary system, the president is not an executive bearer and cannot dissolve the parliament, which represents the will of the sovereign. The only constitutions that allow something similar are those of South Africa and Namibia. However, there too, presidents are directly elected by the people and can dissolve the parliament only for clear reasons, defined in the constitution. Similarly, in these two countries, the parliament can dismiss the head of state in cases where there is a lack of cooperation between them or when the system is blocked, always within the constitutional rules.
In all countries with a parliamentary system, parliament can only be dissolved for two reasons: first, for reasons clearly defined by the constitution; second, through decisions taken by the parliament itself. In the Constitution of Kosovo, these circumstances are clearly defined in Article 82 and have been interpreted by three judgments of the Constitutional Court. For this reason, the “dissolution” on March 5 served Kurti’s interests, providing him with arguments to advance the destruction of the constitutional order through quasi-constitutional means. The president’s unconstitutional decree created the ground for Kurti’s populist rhetoric and practice, with the aim of capturing central institutions.
In this context, new elections are the last hope to stop constitutional regression. Only through the democratic process and voting can the integrity of the parliamentary system be preserved, while any attempt to transform the nature of this system serves Kurti's populist path and his goal of total seizure of power.
The author is the first president of the Constitutional Court and a professor of law and international relations.
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