Written by: Adri Nurellari
Among the alternative explanations circulating for the origin of the state, that of Mancur Olson stands out, who has put forward a theory that strips away any romantic illusions about the “social contract” to replace it with the cold logic of the robbery of “bandits”. For classical thinkers, starting with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the state is usually shown as a moral story that sees the state as a product of reason and consent. According to them, people, wanting to end the chaos of the “war of all against all”, voluntarily surrender individual freedom to a collective mechanism to guarantee order, security and justice. However, this normative line has been challenged early on by the skepticism of David Hume and then by the empirical approach of Olson, with the argument that the state does not come from bargaining, but is created as a result of force, interest and the organization of domination.
According to the latter, in stateless territories, there were villages that were plundered from time to time by wandering gangs, so people produced only enough to survive, because they knew that everything in excess could be taken away tomorrow by the 'wandering bandit'. In this chaos, a dominant bandit emerges, who realizes that the destruction of the resource consequently impoverishes the robber himself. But, at some point, he stops and thinks that, if he stays, eliminates rivals and establishes some order and stability, people will produce more and he can take a large share of this increased production every year. Thus, he stops being a robber who wanders in search of loot and transforms into an immobile ruler who establishes order and taxes, minimally protects property, does some public work for the community and punishes the violence of others. He does all this not because he has suddenly become better, but simply because he has realized that this is more convenient for him. So, for Olson, the embryonic state is nothing more than an optimization of extortion that comes from the transformation from the "roving bandit" who steals and flees, leaving behind the desert, to the "stable bandit."
But this theory is not just a historical explanation. It is a lens for understanding why some states function and others are stuck in a permanent state of transition. The difference between a thriving state and a failing state also depends on the ruler’s time horizon. If the autocrat believes he will last long, he has an interest in increasing the productivity of the economy he controls and, in particular, harvesting less today in order to have more tomorrow. But if he feels that his chair is shaking, he reverts to the logic of the wandering robber: “take what you can, as quickly as you can, before the next one comes.” This is the moment where Olson’s theory encounters Albanian reality, undergoing a mutation that he perhaps did not foresee and which has to do with the fact that the elites who control the country make their money here but project their future abroad.
Albania today seems to be caught at exactly this point, the problem is not the lack of a state. The problem is that those who have more power and capital have found a way to benefit from it without being tied to its future. On paper, the state functions because formally it has institutions, it has rules, it has some control over force and a tax system, so the “traveling bandit” phase seems to have been left behind. But the way the elites think and act is not entirely that of a long-term power that invests in the country. On the contrary, we have an elite that has been in power for a long time, but behaves as if it is temporary towards Albania itself, that sees the territory not as a homeland, but as an asset in liquidation, robbing it to the core wherever, whatever and however it can.
To understand this, we must look above all at the behavior of the economic elite. Unlike classical productive capitalism (where merit is earned through innovation), our elite often operates through obtaining licenses, tenders, or construction permits, that is, by collecting “rent” from public assets. This explains why they do not need strong institutions, because it is known that rent requires proximity to power, not market competition.
In recent years, it has become almost an identity element for the biggest Albanian entrepreneurs to show off their investments in the US, Austria, Italy or Greece. It is not just diversification; it is a form of prestige. At the same time, their families are increasingly living abroad, their children are studying at Western universities and often do not return, while second citizenships have become a strategic asset.
In parallel, the “Exit” is not only physical (leaving abroad), but also institutional. When the elite creates “islands” of security (neighborhoods surrounded by guards, private hospitals, private schools), it has practically exited the state without leaving the territory. They live in a parallel Albania that has no connection to that of the ordinary citizen.
When the elite does not use the public education system itself, there is no strong incentive to improve it; when it does not use the domestic health system, there is no urgency for reform. Likewise, when it lives partly abroad in Vienna, London or Dubai, its connection to the natural, urban and social space of the country weakens. Thus, a deep disconnect is created between those who make decisions and those who experience their consequences. This is related to the concept of “skin in the game”, as Nassim Taleb emphasizes, which means that decision-makers must also bear the consequences of their decisions. When the elites do not live with the consequences of the system (because they have security, quality services and a future abroad) they lose interest in building Albania and focus only on its exploitation.
Here Olson's metaphor transforms into something more sinister: from bandit to parasite. The sustainable bandit, at least, wanted the organism to live long, to grow, and thus to produce more. The modern parasite has a different logic: maximize the extraction of juice before migrating to another body. Albania serves to generate money, while the West serves to convert that money into security, luxury, and quality of life. This "extortionate balance" keeps institutions strong enough to maintain order so that the parasite can feed peacefully, but weak enough not to prevent or punish its abuses.
The logic of the parasite is, in essence, a refined throwback to the wandering bandit. It has no interest in strengthening the organism that sustains it, but only in keeping it functional enough to continue feeding on it. Unlike the “sustainable bandit” model where the ruler invests in increasing the resource in order to benefit more in the future, the parasite operates with a shorter and more opportunistic horizon, maximizing extraction today, without worrying about sustainability tomorrow. It does not invest in strengthening the “body” that feeds it, but extracts the maximum today, while preparing its exit tomorrow, transferring capital, family, and security abroad. It does not build strong institutions, because they limit abuse; it does not invest in long-term development, because its benefit is not linked to the future of the country and the moment the organism weakens too much, it is ready to move elsewhere, leaving behind an exhausted body. In this way, the territory does not become a resource that is developed, but a space that is gradually exploited and consumed, until it no longer has anything to offer.
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