Blerim Vakaj
If democracy were a building, the electoral system would be the foundation. While I was superficially reflecting on electoral models across Europe, I realized that it is very difficult to decide which model comes closest to the ideal for the foundations of democracy and in particular for our Albanian foundations. In my opinion, elections should realize four main pillars:
1. Justice
2. Democracy
3. National Unity
4. Representation
The model of this Nordic country as a masterpiece of political engineering
I think that the Danish system is undoubtedly a masterpiece set in the temporal and anthropological context of the country. Denmark is a constitutional monarchy, where the monarchy has a largely ceremonial and unifying role for the people, while government is exercised by parliament. In this Nordic country, elections for the Folketing (Parliament) and its functioning are not seen simply as a contest for power, but as a “sacred act” of representation. One proof of this “sacredness” is Negative Parliamentarism: In Denmark, a government can govern with only 25%, 30% or 40% of the votes, as long as there is no absolute majority voting against it in any essential vote. This system does not require forced support, but functional tolerance.
THE DUALITY BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE NATIONAL
The Danish system, with its 179 seats, relies on a fascinating duality of 110 years:
Local representation: The country is divided into 10 regions and 92 nomination districts. Candidates are neighbors and members of the area. Through personal voting, the voter is not a prisoner of a closed party list, but chooses the individual who gives voice to his district and region.
National justice: This system is a strict guard against distortion. It prevents cases where a “super candidate” or a strong stronghold creates an “artificial majority,” leaving millions of other votes without weight.
Compensatory Mandates: Where Mathematics Serves Morality
There are 40 compensatory seats in total. If the first 135 seats are the voice of the regions, these 40 are the pure will of the nation. This mechanism ensures that no vote is lost. If a party deserves more seats nationally than it won in the zones, the system gives them to it through these lists. The electoral system with balancing mechanisms that link parliamentary representation to real support at the national level, limiting the disproportionate influence of local strongholds. In this way, it prevents narrow interests, or people with dubious or financial influences concentrated in specific zones, from translating into political power. This obstacle increases the legitimacy, fairness and representativeness of the parliament. The balance is adjusted until the political picture is identical to the will of the people, inviting national responsibility and unitarism.
LOW THRESHOLD FACING A PROPOSAL FOR AN “IDENTITY THRESHOLD”
The Danish system has a threshold of only 2%, which invites diversity and prevents radicalism. However, given the local tradition, the fragility of democracy, the character of the country, our history and experiences, I would propose a higher threshold, perhaps even 10%. This threshold would say goodbye to backroom parties or occult regional interests. And it would put an end to the democratic deficit. One would ask: What will happen to those votes that are below 10%? They would not be lost, but would be dealt with through a quick post-election coalition:
1. Small parties can pool their votes to pass the threshold.
2. They can make representation in a fair ratio with votes and compromise.
3. Very small parties may be represented with one MP through time rotation (for as many days, weeks or months as they are entitled to according to the percentage of votes within the 4-year mandate).
What does this type of system bring? The MP for the citizen, the party for the nation
This type of proportionality encourages the responsibility of each individual or party that seeks to represent a certain group or population, maintains almost majority representation for the citizen, but proportional identity for the nation. It forces parties to have an interest in every inch of Albanianness, treating Tropoja and Saranda with the same importance. No regional bastion, like Fier or others, can dominate the national will anymore. And all parties would be encouraged to develop doctrine and vision and not wait for opportunism and with one or two mandates impose themselves and seize 20-30-40% of power from a government with 68-69 mandates. As has happened before. This high-threshold form forces parties to make catharsis and internal compromises according to a goal, vision and doctrine before scattering people. Strengthening alternatives.
Slovakia: A single electoral district (Extreme National Unity)
System: The entire state is considered a single electoral district. There are no divisions into regions or zones.
Threshold: 5% for parties and 7% for coalitions.
Effect: All representation is produced only at the national level, forcing parties to almost completely ignore local interests.
On paper it seems like the most proportional system possible, but in practice it is also one of the most criticized. Having no territorial connection, the figure of the “neighboring representative” is lost. Deputies are mainly obliged to party lists and not to the citizens of a specific area, while the parliament is often dominated by the elites of the capital (Bratislava). Mathematical proportionality is achieved, but real local representation is sacrificed.
Slovenia (Proportional with residual mandates)
It uses a model that closely resembles Denmark in terms of correction logic.
System: 90 seats in total. The country is divided into 8 electoral units, each with 11 districts.
Special: They have guaranteed mandates for minorities (1 seat for the Italian minority and 1 for the Hungarian one), which speaks of a fair ethnic representation.
Threshold: 4%.
Like Denmark, Slovenia uses “residual” mandates to ensure that votes that did not produce MPs at the local level are pooled at the national level to produce mandates. This model maintains the link to the territory, but at the same time corrects the injustices of local distribution, balancing regional representation with national proportionality. As a result, no vote is lost and the MP remains connected to his or her constituency, without sacrificing electoral fairness.
FOR CONCLUSION
This reflection does not aim to idealize a foreign model, but to show that a functional electoral system is built only when it matches the social, historical and political character of the country where it is applied. The Danish case proves that fair representation does not come from artificial majorities, but from the balance between local representation, national proportionality and the culture of institutional compromise. The novelty of this material lies in the proposal of a high-threshold proportionality, accompanied by corrective mechanisms and post-electoral cooperation, as an alternative to fragmentation and political opportunism. This model maintains the connection of the deputy with the citizen, but shifts the responsibility of the parties towards the nation, forcing them to build vision, doctrine and consensus before seeking power. The recent elections in Denmark, as usual, produced a multi-party parliament. But there this system works very well, even with “negative parliamentarism”. As I suggested above, the high threshold accomplishes the four points that elections should accomplish and avoids a long list of parties as in the graph below, encouraging parties to pass the test of internal democracy, political compromise, and political maturity before going to the polls. In this sense, the electoral system is not treated simply as a mathematical formula, but as an instrument of national unity, democratic legitimacy, and political maturity. This approach aims to turn elections from an arithmetic mechanism into a real act of public representation and accountability.
The author, member of the Brain Gain Department of the PD (Panorama)
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